Includes bibliographical references and index.

Preface -- Introduction -- Representations and basic assumptions -- The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Analyzing behavior in static settings -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location, partnership, and social unrest -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Analyzing behavior in dynamic settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Sequential rationality and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Information -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation -- Appendices -- Index.